Abstract. The theoretical literature follows two different approaches to explain the endogenous formation of a Customs Union (CU). The first one explains CU formation through the willingness of integrating partners to exploit terms-of-trade effects. Indeed, as the union forms, the "domestic market" gets larger and members' international market power increases. The alternative explanation is related to political-economy aspects such as the CU offering the possibility of exchanging markets or protection within the enlarged market. Which is the engine behind CU formation? This is the question at the core of this paper. Results suggest that in the case of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur) both forces were important. Terms-of-trade effects account for between 6 and 28 percent of the explained variation in the structure of protection. There is also evidence that the terms-of-trade externalities among Mercosur's members have been internalized in the Common External Tariff (CET).
Introduction
The international trade literature has followed at least two distinct approaches to explain the existence of tariffs. The first one is known as the terms-of-trade approach. It explains the presence of tariffs in terms of the ability of large countries to influence world prices. A tariff reduces the international demand for the import-good and therefore decreases its international prices, which in turn improves the terms-of-trade of the importing country (see Corden, 1974) . This allows the tariff-imposing country to redistribute revenue from the rest-of-the-world to itself. The second approach is known as the endogenous tariff formation theory and views trade policy as a way of redistributing income towards preferential groups or lobbies --preferred in a political-economy sense (see Hillman, 1982 or Mayer 1984 .
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The explanation for regionalism or Customs Union (CU) formation has also traditionally followed these two approaches (see Winters, 1996) . The terms-of-trade theory has argued that the formation of a CU may also be explained by the willingness of integrating partners to internalize their terms-of-trade effect. Indeed, if countries tend to import the same product, then by forming a customs union they increase their international market power (see Riezman, 1985 or Krugman, 1991 , and the literature that has followed). The endogenous tariff formation literature focuses on the ability to exchange markets or protection within CU (see Hillman, Long and Moser, 1995 or Grossman and Helpman, 1995a) .
In analyzing the effects of regionalism on the multilateral system, these approaches lead to different conclusions (see Winters, 1996) . For example, using the terms-of-trade approach, Krugman (1991) (or Bond and Syropoulos, 1996) concludes that tariffs on restof-the-world imports should increase after the formation of a regional block. This is related to the internalization of terms-of-trade effects in the Common External Tariff 1 There is at least a third approach which emphasize on real world departures from Pareto optimality, providing a second-best argument for the use of protection based on economic efficiency (see Bhagwati, 1971 ). This includes: infant-industry arguments (which are of particular relevance in the case of Latin America), imperfect competition, tariff revenue motives, etc...In fact, the first approach above may be considered as a sub-category of the theory of tariffs as responses to distortions.
(CET). Indeed, if potential members of a CU tend to import similar goods, then the formation of a larger block will naturally lead to higher tariffs, as market power in international markets increase. Other authors, such as Richardson (1994) or Panagariya and Findlay (1994) , using political-economy arguments, find that tariffs with respect to the rest-of-the world should decline after the formation of a customs union. This is generally due to Olson's free-riding problem in larger groups. As the lobbying group size increases, it becomes more difficult to get organized and the effectiveness of the lobbying group declines. 2 Thus, it seems important to know what the forces are behind tariffs.
This paper addresses the following questions: What is the dominating force behind regionalism? Are regional integration blocks formed to internalize terms-of-trade effects?
Or are political-economy forces the predominant determinants? The analysis is conducted ex-post, in the sense that we take the regional block as given and identify the determinants of the CET. In other words, we do not explicitly study the ex-ante forces that led to the formation of the regional block, but infer this by identifying the determinants of the ex-post structure of the CET.
The Common Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur) seems an interesting case from which to try to identify which of these motivations is behind regionalism, for at least three reasons.
First, Mercosur members have only recently negotiated a CET (the first decision was reached in December 1994 in Ouro Preto) and therefore the structure of their CET has limited external influence (e.g., no WTO offers). Moreover, if Latin American countries tariff structure may had been determined by "purely" political factors, such as the "import-substitution" of the 1970s and early 1980s, recent studies showed that in the 2 In the absence of free-riding effects in group formation, some studies have found, within a politicaleconomy setting, that protection may actually increase beyond the pre-regional integration levels after the formation of a CU or Common Market due to non-linearities in the determination of the CET (see Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga, 1999 , for an example, or Winters, 1996 for a comprehensive survey of the literature).
1990s tariffs have been primarily influenced by private interests (see Faina, 1995 and Soloaga, 1998) .
Second, the larger members of Mercosur (Argentina and Brazil) are sufficiently large trading countries to influence world prices, at least in some markets; 3 there is also recent evidence by Chang and Winters (1999) of the existence of terms-of-trade effects in Mercosur countries.
Third, and more practically, industrial data are available for the larger members of Mercosur at a relatively high level of disaggregation, which would be necessary when trying to identify terms-of-trade effects.
Our results suggest that in the case of Mercosur, both forces were important in the determination of the common external tariff. Terms-of-trade effects account for between 6 and 28 percent of the explained variance in the structure of protection. This is a surprising result given that the bloc is small in terms of world GDP. This result challenges researchers to reconsider how small a "small open economy" is. There is also evidence that Mercosur members have internalized in their CET the terms-of-trade externality that arises when members import the same products. Thus, although politicaleconomy forces seem to explain a larger proportion of the common external tariffs, the terms-of-trade rationale for tariffs cannot be neglected.
Determining Mercosur's Common External Tariff
Mercosur's CET varies between 0 and 20 percent. In 1996, the average CET over the whole universe was 11 percent, though in the sample analyzed it is 13 percent. 4 Figure 1 3 Jointly Brazil and Argentina represent a little bit more than 1 percent of world imports. At the 4-digit level of the ISIC Rev. 2, the shares range from 0.024 percent (logging) to 5.8 percent (grain mill products). At the 6-digit level of the Harmonised system, the shares range from 0 percent (goat meat and insulin, for example) to more than 30 percent (ethyl alcohol, propylene dichloride, for example). 4 The average CET over the whole tariff universe is close to 11 percent. Due to mapping of the data from trade to industrial classification some of the agricultural products had to be dropped.
illustrates the deviations from the average tariff for each of the 80 industries of the ISIC 4-digit classification. It suggests a significant variation that calls for an explanation.
Industries with large deviations above the mean, i.e., more than 6 percentage points, are concentrated in Distilled Spirits (ISIC 3131), Soft Drinks (3134), Textiles (3220, 3223 and 3240), and Transport Equipment (3849). Industries with large deviations below the mean, i.e., more than 6 percentage points, include Drugs and Medicine (3522), Petroleum
Refineries (3530), and Cement (3692).
The remainder of the paper attempts to measure the relative importance of the terms-oftrade and political-economy effects in the determination of the structure of the CET.
Predictions of the endogenous tariff formation literature
In the absence of lobbies, the presence of market power in international markets has been identified early as a rationale for tariffs by a benevolent government. In the presence of terms-of-trade effects, a welfare maximizing government sets tariffs so that they are negatively correlated with the elasticity of export supply faced by the country. It is only in the extreme case of a "small" country facing an infinitely elastic supply of exports (which implies no terms-of-trade effects) that the optimal tariff would be zero.
The political-economy literature has followed different approaches in providing explanations for the structure of protection. This has led to many predictions that relate industry characteristics and economy-wide fundamentals to tariff levels. 5 As suggested
by Helpman (1995) , different approaches tend to generate similar predictions. These predictions are discussed in appendix 3. As an example, the most common prediction in the literature is that highly concentrated sectors tend to have higher levels of protection as they can more easily overcome the free-riding problem in organising an interest group. Grossman and Helpman (1995b) introduced the terms-of-trade motive for protection in a political-economy framework, where the government is subject to industry lobbying.
Using the influence-driven approach, developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994) , they
show that in such a context the tariff structure can be disentangled into two components:
a lobbying and a terms-of trade component. The sectoral pattern of protection is then determined by both the political-economy variables discussed in appendix 3 and the elasticity of export supply faced by the country:
where T is the vector of tariffs across industries; PE is the matrix of political-economy variables across industries and ε is the vector of export supply elasticities faced by the country in each industry.
In a CU, such as Mercosur, the same forces are at work. However, the structure of the optimal CET will depend on the institutional set up. Several cases can be envisaged. The relevant case for Mercosur is one where the CET is the outcome of bargaining between member-country governments. Indeed, the Mercosur experience in the determination of the CET is one of bargaining between governments that were subject to national lobbying pressures. Thus, the CET reflects cooperation between member countries, but not the integration of their economies. In such a setup and using the influence-driven approach, Cadot et al. (1999) have shown that the CET is determined by the production-weighted sum of the different political-economy variables in member countries. This implies that the CET in sector i mainly reflects the preferences of the member country that has the largest level of production in sector i. Thus:
where superscript c refers to member countries of the CU and subscript i refer to industries;
i CET is the CET in industry i; c i γ is the share of country c in the whole CU production of industry i. Equation (2) is at the heart of the empirical analysis below that attempts to explain the structure of Mercosur's CET .
Empirical Model
As suggested above, the optimal tariff for a large country is negatively correlated with the elasticity of supply of foreign exporters to Mercosur's markets. The empirical estimation of these elasticities is beyond the purpose of this paper. It requires detailed information on bilateral trade flows at the tariff line level and the characteristics of producers based in countries exporting to the Mercosur's market. To our knowledge there are no estimates reported in the literature of the elasticity of export supply faced by any country in the world.
The alternative path, and the one we followed, is to identify the forces behind the elasticity of export supply faced by a country. As shown below, this elasticity can be written as a function of three elements. First, the market share of the importing country in world markets. Second, the total world export supply elasticity. And third, the import demand elasticities of other importing countries in the world (as well as their shares in world markets).
The empirical analysis mainly uses the import share of the importing country as a proxy, for reasons we make clear below. For now, note that this proxy has a straightforward intuitive rationale. At the limit, if a country has an infinitely small share of world markets, it will face an (almost) infinitely elastic supply function from foreign exporters.
Its ability to influence world prices is going to be very small (price-taker). On the other hand, if a country has a share of 1 in world markets, then the supply function from foreign exporters will be more inelastic. Its ability to influence world prices is going to be relatively high (price-maker).
Import shares as a proxy for elasticities of foreign export supply
Are import shares a good proxy for elasticities of foreign export supply? 6 To answer this question, we first need to define what we mean by export supply faced by one country. A natural way of identifying the foreign export supply curve faced by country i is the following: whenever country i increases its import demand, this results in a price increase. This price increase will lead to an increase in quantities exported to country i, which country i perceives as a move along the export supply function it faces. This quantity increase is a combination of the increase in world export supply and the reduction of import demand in other markets due to the increase in prices. By observing the price and quantity increase, country i determines the export supply it faces. Formally, let us define world export supply as:
where T x is world export supply and i x are quantities exported to country i. The (perceived) export supply function faced by country i is given by:
where
are imports of country j (which by definition are equal to quantities exported to country j by the rest-of-the-world). The idea is that the price increase in world markets is due to a shift in demand in country i, and, therefore, all other countries will move along their import demand curve. This will be perceived by country i as a change in quantities exported to its market following the change in prices. 7 Differentiate both sides of (4) by p, multiply by T x p and rearrange, yielding:
where i ε is the elasticity of export supply faced by country i; T ε is the elasticity of world supply; and j η is the elasticity of import demand in country j. Define
as the share of country k in world markets and solve for i ε :
Ideally, one can calculate the elasticities of export supply faced by a country using equation (6). Import shares can be easily calculated and there exist some estimates of export supply elasticities and import demand elasticities in the literature. Thus, to capture the elasticity of export supply we are left with two options. First, our preferred option is to use the market share of the importing country (Mercosur) as a proxy and thus avoid having to use trade elasticities, which are necessarily estimated with error. Second, we could use the estimates of import demand elasticities of the US estimated in Shiells et al. (1986) . Then assuming that all countries in the world have the same import demand elasticities at the industry level, and given the lack of estimated export supply elasticities, that the latter are uniform across industries and equal to 0.5, equation (6) becomes:
To use equation (7) one needs to correct for the fact that it is a generated regressor that has been estimated with error (see Gawande, 1997) . Results reported in appendix 4 use equation (7) and Gawande's correction method as a proxy for i ε . 10 However, due to the fact that our estimates are sensitive to the choice of T ε , we decided to use i λ as a proxy for i ε in the paper and leave the discussion of estimates using equation (7) for appendix 4. Note that the term in square brackets in equation (7) is always positive and therefore i λ can be used as a proxy for i ε . 
Determining the CET: at the tariff line or at the industry level?
To understand how tariffs are set, one first needs to know at which level these are decided. Mercosur's tariff schedule has as many as 6000 tariff lines (at the 8 digit level of the harmonised system). This tends to suggest that the appropriate level of analysis for tariff formation is the tariff line. On the other hand, it could be argued that lobbying is done at the industry level, as for example the textile lobby represents textile producers and not producer's of certain type of textiles. However, the textile lobby will rationally lobby for protection only in certain tariff lines where there is local production.
A quick look at Mercosur's tariff schedule confirms this. In 1996, the tariff level for "High tenacity nylon for retail market" (HS 54021010; a textile product) was 16 percent.
At the same time, the tariff level for "High tenacity amid for retail market" (HS 54021020; another textile) was 2 percent. All other "High tenacity yarn" (HS 54021090) had a 16 percent tariff also. If lobbying was done at the industry level, all these tariffs should be the same (if only determined by lobbying activities). However, we observed a analysis for tariff formation is the tariff line and not the industry.
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Tariff data is available at the 8-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS, more than 6000 lines). Trade data is available at the 6-digit level of the HS (4261 lines However, given the constraint on industrial data, which is available only at the 4-digit industry level, analysis at the 6-digit level may give too much importance to the terms-oftrade effects in explaining the structure of the CET. To check the robustness of our results we report regressions both at the 4-digit and 6-digit level.
Empirical CET determination
The Common External tariff in Mercosur is double-censored between 0 and 20 percent and ignoring this censoring could bias our results. 13 In other words, if only industry- 12 One could argue that the difference can be explained by terms-of-trade effects, but Mercosur's (Argentina and Brazil) imports of HS 54021010 are equal to US$ 167000 dollars and imports of HS 54021020 are equal to US$ 281000 dollars (according to WTO notifications). World trade at this level of disaggregation is not available, but such small absolute amounts and differences cannot explain such an important tariff differential.
specific political-economy and terms-of-trade factors determined tariffs, some tariffs could have been negative or larger than 20. To allow for censoring we estimate a tobit CET model: All the variables are constructed as described in section 2, i.e., each of them is given by the production-weighted average of the respective variable in each of the member countries. 14 As argued above, we believe that the tariff setting is done at the tariff line level. As industrial data is not available at such a high level of disaggregation we assumed that industrial data was uniformly distributed across tariff lines in a given industry. Thus, we divided all the industrial data by the number of lines existing at the 6-digit level of the HS within each 4-digit ISIC category.
We are conscious that some of the explanatory variables could be jointly determined with the dependent variable and therefore subject to endogeneity bias. 
Results
The second column of Table 1 report the results of the estimation of equation (8) at the 4-digit ISIC level (80 observations). We report results using import shares ) (λ as a proxy for the elasticity of export supply. We obtained similar results using equation (7) and these are reported in appendix 4.
problem. At the 3-digit level (27 sectors), the share of Uruguay and Paraguay is always below 10 percent, except in the case of textiles, where it reaches 13 percent. (see Olarreaga and Soloaga, 1998) . 15 Obviously, serial correlation in some variables may have watered down this correction. 16 One could argue that the 1996 CET is highly correlated with Argentina and Brazil's 1992 external tariff and therefore the bias correction, by using lagged variables is not without drawbacks. However, simple partial correlations between Argentina and Brazil's 1992 external tariff and the 1996 CET yield values of .64 and .74 respectively. We acknowledge that these are high, but at least not perfectly correlated.
As argued before, tariffs are determined at the tariff line level and therefore our data should be interpreted as group data. Traditional estimation with group data requires that each observation be weighted by the number of observations in each group (i.e., multiplied by the square root of the number of observations in each group). The rationale is that if the error term is independently distributed at the tariff line level, then the variance of the error term at the group level will be negatively correlated with the number of lines in each group (i.e., groups with large numbers of observations will have small variance). Given that the number of observations in each group varies from 1 (ISIC 3131
Distilling, rectifying and blending spirits) to 501 (ISIC 3511 Manufacture of basic industrial products), this could lead to serious heteroscedasticity problems.
A problem with the above correction is that it assumes that the errors at the tariff line are independently distributed. If one believes that observations in the same industry share common unobserved determinants, then the above correction may re-introduce some heteroscedasticity. 17 We tested for this after weighting our observations following Dickens' (1990) test and we could not reject the presence of a common unobserved determinant at the industry level. 18 Thus, we corrected for the presence of a common error component using a two-stage approach suggested by Dickens (1990) . 18 Dickens (1990) suggests running the squared error term of the weighted regression on a constant and the number of observations. If the coefficient is significant (at the 99 percent level in our case), then one should try an alternative weighting method. Using Kennedy's (1985) rule of thumb, that the estimated variance of the common element over the variance of the number of observation should be smaller than 15 percent for the traditional weighting method to work, we also concluded against the traditional method. suggesting that counter-lobbying at the industry lobby was important. These three variables are also robust to both, exclusion of other variables and observations.
These results seem to show the significance of the terms-of-trade effect on tariff determination. However, by grouping data at the industry level (4-digit ISIC), we are losing an important amount of information of within industry tariff and import shares variation. Also, as argued before, there is strong evidence that tariffs are not determined at the industry level but at the tariff line level. To include this information, we therefore run the regression at the 6-digit HS level.
At the 6-digit level data there are only 126 different tariff levels over the 4200 tariff lines, indicating that clustering of data could present a problem for our estimations. We address this issue by applying the Generalised Huber correction procedure. Standard errors are corrected for within CET correlation and heteroscedasticity. As expected the overall significance of the regression after the correction falls. Again we comment only on results reported in column 3 using λ as a proxy for the elasticity of export supply, given the non-robustness of results using equation (7). The above analysis that both lobbying by industries (pro-lobbying and counter-lobbying) and terms-of-trade effects can contribute to the explanation of the structure of the CET in Mercosur. Our results suggest that labour-unions do not contribute to the explanation of the structure of the CET. The relative contribution of the terms-of-trade effect to the overall explanation of the tariff structure is studied in section 5.
Internalization: did it occur?
Terms-of-trade effects lead to price externalities among countries that trade similar goods. When Brazil raises its tariffs on imported goods, this leads to a fall in international prices. If Argentina imports similar goods, this causes a positive externality for Argentina, as imports are now cheaper. In other words, had Brazil considered the effects of its tariffs not only on its terms-of-trade, but also on Argentina's terms-of-trade, it would have set a higher tariff. Obviously, the externality would have been negative had Argentina's exports to the world been of mainly the same products as Brazil imported.
The creation of a CU raises the opportunity for the internalization of the terms-of-trade externality, as suggested by Riezman (1985) . Members of a CU should not be focusing any longer on the individual countries' market power when trying to set their tariffs, but on the market power of the whole CU. This section explores whether the Mercosur bargaining process over the CET has led to the internalization of this externality.
In terms of our empirical model, this implies that the terms-of-trade variable should not be constructed as the production weighted average of members' market share in world markets, but as the simple sum of members' market share in world markets. That sum is the share of the whole union in world markets.
In the case of Mercosur, the internalization of the terms-of-trade externality should lead to a larger effect of the terms-of-trade variable in the CET. The reason for this is that Argentina and Brazil tend to import similar products, as shown in figure 3. Indeed figure   3 shows that there is a positive relationship between the import shares of Argentina and Brazil in the world market at the 4-digit level of the ISIC classification. 20 This suggests a positive terms-of-trade externality between the two members of Mercosur. Table 2 reports the results of the estimation of equation (8) when the terms-of-trade variable is constructed as the sum of Mercosur members' import shares. As expected, the coefficient on the terms-of-trade variable increases not only in terms of levels, but also in significance. All the other variables keep the same sign and same level of significance.
The general fit of the regression also increases, both at the 4-digit ISIC and the 6-digit HS level.
To determine the correct empirical specification, i.e., whether one should specify the terms-of-trade variable as including internalization or not, we performed two different types of non-nested tests. The first, a "super model" test, includes all the variables that the two models have in common and also the variables that are different in one equation.
The test consists of verifying which of the non-common variables are significant and which are not. The largest drawback of this test is that it does not really distinguish between the two models, but rather between one of the models and a hybrid one. In our case, there may also be some collinearity between the two terms-of-trade variables, i.e., the internalized terms-of-trade variable and the non-internalized terms-of-trade variable.
The J test proposed by Davidson and McKinnon (1981) This led us to conclude that in the case of Mercosur, the governments were aware of the terms-of-trade externalities and that these were internalized within the CET. This result supports the hypothesis that terms-of-trade effects were non-negligible determinants of Mercosur's CET. But how important were these effects in explaining the structure of the CET? This is the question addressed in the next section.
How important is the terms-of-trade effect?
The previous section has identified terms-of-trade effects behind the structure of Mercosur's CET. Moreover, there is evidence that the terms-of-trade externality among Mercosur members has been internalized within the CET. This would suggest that even for "small" countries (around 1 percent of world markets), the terms-of-trade rationale for 20 A similar positive correlation is found at the 6-digit of the HS classification.
tariffs may be valid. However, before concluding on the importance of this effect on the tariff structure, we need to measure the share of the CET variation that can be attributed to the terms-of-trade effect.
One way of answering this question is to run equation (8) The share of the explained variation that can be attributed to λ , according to these three pseudo-2 R s is given in table 4. Our results suggest that in the case of Mercosur, termsof-trade motivations explain between 6 and 18 percent of the total variation. At the 6-digit HS level, the simple average of the three alternative indicators suggests that 13 percent of the explanation can be attributed to terms-of-trade effects. Similarly, at the 4-digit ISIC level, the average is 8 percent. This suggests that an important share of the terms-of-trade action occurs within industries. 21 The indicator Ψ may be seen as a maximum or minimum bound for the explained share depending on whether there is positive or negative correlation between the λ and the political-economy variables, respectively. Values in table 4 should be seen as minimum bounds at the 6-digit level of the HS and maximum bounds at the 4-digit level of ISIC, due to positive correlation at the 6-digit and negative at the 4-digit level.
Taking the total average over the 6 possible shares indicates that 13 percent of the explained CET variation can be clearly attributed to terms-of-trade effects. This is an extremely large value, especially in the case of Mercosur, whose member countries are not the first candidates when one thinks of price-makers in world markets.
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Conclusions
The trade literature has followed two different approaches to explain the existence of tariffs: the terms-of-trade approach and the interest group pressures approach. When analyzing the effects of regionalism on the multilateral system, the two approaches lead to different conclusions. For example, using the terms-of-trade approach, one concludes that tariffs on rest-of-the-world imports should increase after the formation of a regional block, because the market power of the region increases and terms-of trade externalities can be internalized in the CET of a CU. On the other hand, using a political-economy approach, one would usually conclude that tariffs with respect to the rest-of-the world decline after the formation of a CU. The rationale is related to free-riding effects in larger lobbying groups. Thus, it seems important to know what the forces are behind tariffs.
Surprisingly, when empirically studying tariff structures, researchers have essentially focused on the second approach and neglected the terms-of-trade as a possible explanatory variable. This study shows that in the case of Mercosur, between 6 and 27 percent of the explained variation of the CET can be attributed to terms-of-trade effects.
We also explore the possibilities of internalization of terms-of-trade effects when member countries import the same goods. There is evidence that Mercosur's bargaining process among members in the determination of the CET has led to the internalization of 22 Using the VZ pseudo-R 2 we found that 17 to 48 percent of the variation in the CET can be attributed to counter-lobbying variables, and 10 to 41 percent to capital owners' pro-lobbying (depending on whether the regression is done at the tariff line or industry level. The contribution of the labour-union proxy is negligible. Note that the large share of counter-lobbying variables in the explanation of the structure may partially explain the significant unilateral tariff reduction in Mercosur's countries during the 1990s. these effects. As Mercosur's members tended to import similar products, the internalization of the positive externality represented an upwards force in the CET.
More generally, these results tend to suggest that the relevance of the "small" country assumption may be limited to a small number of cases, as Mercosur represents only 1 percent of world markets, but terms-of-trade effects seem to be relatively important.
Finally, when studying the implications of regionalism on external tariffs towards nonmembers, one should try to simultaneously model the two rationales behind CU formation, as they both explain a significant share of tariff formation. errors. ** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; * at the 5 percent level and # at the 10 percent level; ⊥ indicates that the sign of the estimated coefficient is not robust to either variable or 4-digit industry exclusion from the regression. b The pseudo-R 2 we used is the single best choice according to Mc Veall and Zimmermann (1994) ,
is the mean of the predicted value. GTAP data gave the input-output matrices, one for each country. We utilized them to calculate the share of production sold by sector i of country j (Sij) as intermediate good to other sectors in the same country. We then applied the Sij to the corresponding sectors in our data set. Some Sij were used more than once since GTAP data have fewer sectors (40) than that from censuses (80). 
ISIC 4-digit Classification
Terms-of-trade effects
• the smaller the elasticity of export supply faced by the country. This is the classic rationale for tariffs for a large country that can influence the terms-of-trade in its favour by setting non-zero tariffs.
Labour union effects
• the larger is the share of labour in this sector relative to total employment in the economy (see Cadot et al., 1997 , for a theoretical justification and de Melo and Tarr, 1994, for an empirical example). The idea behind this result is that if labour unions are organised, then the larger is the share of employment in this sector, the larger is the weight of this sector's labour union in the political game.
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Counter-lobbying in factor or input markets
• the lower the equilibrium wage in this sector. In a political game where there is rivalry in the labour market (which can be segmented for different groups of industries), the level of the equilibrium wage, ceteris paribus, will determine the incentives by other sectors to lobby against an increase in tariff in one of the industries. At the limit, if the wage is zero, there are no incentives to counter-lobbying.
• the lower the share of sector production that is purchased by other sectors as intermediates (see Cadot et al., 1997 , for a theoretical justification and Ray, 1991 , or Marvel and Ray, 1983 , for empirical examples). Here we are capturing lobbying rivalry. If sector j purchases goods from sector i then sector j will counter-lobby any increase in sector i's level of protection. Thus, the higher the share of sector i production that is purchased by other sectors the smaller the endogenous tariff.
Therefore, as long as consumers are not organised, consumer goods receive ceteris paribus higher levels of protection than intermediate goods.
• the smaller the share of intra-industry trade. Levy (1997) argues that an increase in intra-industry trade benefits all agents whereas an increase in inter-industry trade has the usual Stolper-Samuelson redistributive effects, and therefore is subject to more conflict and higher lobbying pressures. Marvel and Ray (1987) suggest an explanation based on intermediate inputs counter-lobbying. They argue that intra-industry trade essentially arises among producers (purchase of intermediate goods), and as producers are more concentrated than consumers, they tend to be more efficient in combating protectionist pressures. This, however, should be captured by our previous variable.
Capital Owners Pro-protectionist Lobbying
• the higher the labour/capital ratio (for empirical evidence, see e.g., Finger and Harrison, 1994, and Rodrik, 1995) . To explain this, one may need to rely on Cadot et al. (1997) who show that tariffs are higher in sectors where the share of capital remuneration in value added is large, after introducing lobbying rivalry on the labour market. A higher labour/capital ratio ceteris paribus has two opposing effects on the share of capital remuneration in value added. On one hand, the direct effect tends to reduce it, as a higher labour/capital ratio obviously implies a smaller capital/labour ratio. On the other hand, a higher labour/capital ratio implies a higher marginal productivity of capital relatively to labour which in turn raises the share of capital remuneration in value added. Under suitably general conditions, it can then be shown that the latter effect dominates the former if the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is smaller than 1 (which is a generally accepted value in the empirical literature).
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• the higher the level of industry concentration (see Rodrik, 1987 , for a theoretical justification and Trefler, 1993 , or Marvel and Ray, 1983 , for empirical examples).
This captures free-riding incentives à la Olson.
• the lower the level of trade-creation. The idea is simply that in sectors where there is an important amount of trade-creation within the region, there is no longer a need to protect domestic producers from rest-of-the world competition, as most foreign competition now comes from within the region.
• the lower the import penetration ratio (see Grossman and Helpman, 1994 , for a theoretical justification). 26 The rationale for this is that the lower the import penetration ratio, the lower is the relative weight of consumers compared to producers in the government's objective function.
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• the larger the increase in import penetration. This captures the idea that declining sectors (those where there is a large increase in import penetration) will tend to be more protected by the government to reduce the adjustment costs (see Brainard and Verdier, 1994 where σ is the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. And the right hand side is larger than zero if σ < 1 . Note that the empirical estimation of the elasticities of substitution between labour and capital generally yield values below one. 26 This result has been challenged on empirical grounds, as discussed by Rodrik (1995) . For empirical examples, see Anderson (1980) or Finger and Harrison (1994) . 27 To see this, note that m y c y y c y = − = − ( )/ / 1 where m are imports (or net imports), c is consumption and y the level of production. Table 5 report results using equation (7) ). Results are qualitatively robust to the alternative specification. The problem with using equation (7) is that results are sensitive to the choice of T ε , which is arbitrarily chosen as being equal across sectors due to lack of estimates. For example, for any value of T ε larger than 3 the estimate in front of i ε 1 is statistically insignificant. 
Appendix 4: An alternative proxy for terms-of-trade effects
